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Path Dependence And Behavorial Lock-In 
At Work:  The Challenge Of Sustaining 
High Performance Work Systems  
In The U.S. 





This article draws on path dependency literature and recent extensions to frame the evolution of 
high performance work systems (HPWS) in the U.S. and to reflect on the implications for firms 
and policy. The article briefly discusses institutional and social influences in the U.S. context that 
may be “locking in” managerial behavior that can prevent HPWS from diffusing or that renders 
HPWS vulnerable over time. In the face of this, in the short run firms may need to insulate the 
organization from institutional pressures and behavior that can erode new work systems. The 
article concludes by noting corporate governance models that elevate employee voice and security 
may be more compatible with HPWS for the long term.  
 





igh performance work systems – commonly defined as a set of complementary work practices that 
include substantive worker participation, effective employee training and learning, employee 
incentive pay, and relatively higher job security – have received growing attention in the past two 
decades for their promise in terms of a variety of firm level outcomes for both employees and employers. Yet 
despite growing empirical evidence of potential gains in employee outcomes and firm productivity and profitability, 
understanding what these “systems” are and how to implement and sustain them over time in the U.S. and other 
settings remains difficult.  
 
  Path dependency literature and recent extensions can help to frame developments in workplace evolution to 
better understand how to overcome barriers to meaningful work design in a particular country. After briefly 
discussing some recent extensions and applications to path development theory, this paper then frames the evolution 
of work in the U.S. using this literature. Drawing on casework by the author and other cases to discuss the potential 
difficulties in implementing and sustaining HPWS in a U.S. setting, the paper then briefly addresses implications for 
firms and for policy.    
 
PATH DEPENDENCY, PATH CREATION, AND “BEHAVIORAL LOCK-IN” 
 
  Paul David (1985) and Brian Arthur’s (1989, 1990, 1994) early work utilised a path dependency framework 
to explain the “lock-in” of sub-optimal technology such as the QWERTY keyboard over the DVORAK keyboard 
and VHS over BETA. This challenge to standard neoclassical orthodoxy was later questioned, with critics claiming 
that QWERTY and VHS were actually efficient solutions, and that the path dependency thesis is suspect (Liebowitz 
and Margolis, 1990, 1995). David, Arthur and others responded by arguing that even if these particular examples are 
not clearly suboptimal or optimal, it does not negate the robustness of the path dependency framework (David, 
2001). Arthur pointed out that his graduate training did not adequately teach him how history shapes the market 
process in these and other examples. In Arthur’s words, “The issue was that these markets worked differently than I 
had been taught they did.” (Gomes, 1998) 
H 
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  Veblen, Myrdal and other institutionalists long ago preceded this line of argument, pointing out that 
historical events and habit are critical in shaping economic choices, whether or not this leads to an “efficient” 
outcome (Veblen, [1899], 1994). Through a historical, evolutionary process, the basic argument is that 
markets can lock-in sub-optimality (or optimality).  
 
  David’s and Arther’s path dependency work primarily develops the notion that a suboptimal technology 
can emerge and lock in over time because of historical luck, the ability to move through a learning curve first, and 
the presence of network effects. Other work has begun to extend the theoretical framework and its application 
further. In a paper drawing on path dependency and related “path creation” literature typified by Garud and 
Karnoe’s work (2001), Stack and Gartland (2003) stress that lock-in (of either a sub-optimal or an optimal result) 
should be seen as a process infused with agency, not as the result of a random event or historical accident. Change 
agents mindfully react to and shape their environment by altering established routines, modifying existing 
institutions, and embracing the unfamiliar until a new structure results. They use the American Brewing industry as 
a case to show that brewing shippers intentionally set about during Prohibition to influence legislation in their favor, 
resulting in more expensive (and inferior) mass-produced beer for the masses when Prohibition was lifted.    
 
  In another paper, Barnes, Stack and Gartland (2004) extend the traditional analysis of technology lock-in 
and briefly apply it to three separate cases; brewing, medical records, and work systems.
1
 Coining the term 
“behavioral lock-in,” Barnes, Stack and Gartland draw on David’s 1985 article to highlight the relatively 
undeveloped behavioral component of David’s assertion that “path dependencies arise in the presence of strong 
technical interrelatedness, scale economies, and irreversibilities due to learning and habituation.” They stress that 
consumer, user, and employee habituation over time can lock-in a particular product or practice, and that this 
behavior can effectively constrain or undermine a superior product or practice. For example, documenting the 
superiority of electronic medical records (EMR) over paper records, they ask a key question: why have physicians 
been so slow to adopt them? Their answer is not financial - evidence suggests that switching would save doctors 
money - but rather that physicians are behaviorally “locked-in” because of habit and their desire to maintain control 
over patient data. In the face of this, the relatively more efficient solution is not automatic. They argue that 
electronic medical records may win out in the long run, but whether or not this occurs may depend critically on 





  A variety of later work has cited behavioral lock-in and developed other examples. For example, Maréchal 
(2009, 2010) has written a series of papers investigating energy inefficiency and “carbon lock-in” due to behavioral 
patterns in the economy. According to Maréchal, traditional economic incentives do not work as anticipated because 
they typically neglect the role of habits; he argues that nuanced policy drawing on the insights of social identity 
theory and social comparison theory in psychology has a better chance of altering the behavior of energy consumers.  
 
HIGH PERFORMANCE WORK SYSTEMS 
 
 One of the key points of the stories above is that end user or employee habituation can impede or 
undermine the diffusion of a potentially more efficient product, practice, or technology, perhaps particularly when a 
potential loss of power is concerned. Many of the cases involve lock-in of technology, but the concept of path 
dependency, path creation, and lock-in can be fruitfully applied to explore other outcomes in the economy. A story 
that parallels the cases detailed above revolves around recent trends in the evolution of work in the U.S. 
 
 In the last three decades, many organizations in the U.S. began to modify their traditional Taylorist/ Fordist 
work systems due to a steep increase in competition in increasingly global markets. For much of the last century 
under Taylorism and Fordism, low trust, tight supervision, relatively adversarial bargaining, and hundreds of rigid 
job classifications characterized the work environment. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, U.S. firms became more 
interested in work design and production techniques inspired by Charles Deming that were modified and time-tested 
successfully in Japan (Womack et al., 1990; Kenney and Florida, 1993). U.S. firms in many industries had no choice 
– they had to try something different or face decline and possible extinction. The successful NUMMI experiment 
                                                 
1 The current paper further develops the work systems case.    
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between GM and Toyota in the 1980s offered even more reason to believe in the competitive advantages of 
workplace design. Largely using the same UAW employees and with minimal modification of factory technology, 
Toyota helped to make one of GM’s worst plants into its best, doubling productivity in a few years and producing 
higher quality cars than any other domestic auto plant (Levine, 1995).   
 
 Despite the success of NUMMI and other plants, many domestic organizations experimenting with work 
initially implemented “new” practices with little thought for how they fit together with other components 
(Appelbaum and Batt, 1994). These individual new practices included: new recruitment and selection techniques, 
increased employee participation in decisions (both on and off-line), work teams, kaizening (continuous, 
incremental improvement of production, work, and the product), increased on and off line training, labor 
management cooperation, trust building measures, increased job security measures, information sharing, measures to 
compress status differentials, incentive pay, and employee stock ownership plans. The initial introduction of quality 
circles (often without other practices) in the 1980s is a prime example of early failure, and the evidence that these 
practices individually contribute to increased performance outcomes is fairly thin (Lawler, 1987; Levine and Tyson, 
1990; Combs et al., 2006).   
 
Over time many researchers and practitioners began to argue that a complementary “system” of work 
practices and employee-relations reform offers the best chance for increased firm performance. Although there is a 
long history of attempting to define what these practices are and how they are complementary, the contours of a 
broad consensus began to emerge in the 1990’s. Now often labeled “high performance work systems,” the core 
complementary practices of these systems can be grouped under three categories: 1) substantive employee 
“participation” in production, 2) increased employee training, and 3) increased incentives for employees – including 
incentive pay and relative job security (Levine and Tyson, 1990; MacDuffie, 1995; Appelbaum et al, 2000). In a 
nutshell, empowered, well-trained employees agree to work in a much more flexible, team centered work 
environment with increased responsibility for making lower level managerial decisions and increased capacity and 
authority for improving the work and production process. In return for increased commitment to the work system 
and the production process, employees receive the intrinsic rewards from more autonomy and authority, and as well 
as extrinsic rewards such as greater pay and job security relative to older models of work. Taken together, this set of 
work practices equips employees with the information, skills, motivation and flexibility necessary to create 
competitive advantage.       
   
 Do these new “work systems” work? Noting that there is still debate about what exactly is critical in these 
systems, evidence is mounting that many firms do manage to increase performance measures in the U.S. and other 
countries given sufficient time. The evidence seems to be especially clear for measures of productivity in 
manufacturing (Ichniowski et al, 1997; Baker, 1999; Appelbaum et al, 2000; Combs et al, 2006). There is also 
evidence that (often initially expensive) high performance work systems increase financial performance (Huselid, 
1995). Finally, there is also growing evidence of increased job satisfaction, increased intrinsic rewards, and 
increased earnings for employees (Berg, 1999; Appelbaum et al, 2000). 
 
BEHAVIORAL LOCK-IN AT WORK 
 
 So given the allure of better outcomes, why don’t all firms in the U.S. implement and sustain work systems 
that have these components? High performance work systems are seemingly diffusing more unevenly than economic 
theory would imply, and many show signs of vulnerability and tenuousness even after being successfully 
implemented. Analogous to the failure of quality circles in the 1980s, there is evidence that the “full blown” 
versions of HPWS are rarer than one would expect and can at least partially revert back to older models of work 
(Appelbaum and Batt, 1994; Pfeffer, 1996, 1998; Osterman, 1994,1998; Tippet, 1997; Barnes, 2001;Vallas et al, 
2003; Godard, 2004; Blasi et al., 2006, Kersley et al., 2006, Lynch, 2007). Using the concepts of path dependency 
and behavioral lock-in, this next section briefly explores possible reasons for this.  
 
 First, strategic managers in the U.S. answer to shareholders first, and this can be problematic for work 
systems that demand initially higher resources and increased commitment to employees. Despite recent increasing 
interest in stakeholder theory and corporate social responsibility on the part of academics and practitioners, the U.S. 
corporate governance environment arguably remains shareholder based and oriented towards measurable cost 
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reduction and boosting profits for the next quarter (Laverty, 2006; Jackson et al., 2011). By biasing strategic 
managers towards short-term financial metrics, this may lock in behavior that undermines the practices necessary to 
create and then sustain a workplace environment stressing greater autonomy, security, and pay for performance for 
employees. Paradoxically, high performance work systems require increased commitment from employees even as 
pressures from largely absentee, uninvolved shareholders in the U.S. invite less commitment to employees. Constant 
pressure to boost share price can lead to a spiral of measurable short term cost cutting. Measurable cost cutting often 
means labor costs. For example, in downturns the first “locked-in” instinct of managers in the U.S. may still be to 
lay off employees, and yet relative job security is a critical component for participatory work systems that ask 
employees to find ways to boost productivity. If employees suspect that more involvement and participation will 
result in less job security because they can “suggest themselves out of a job,” particularly in a fragile economy, they 
may rationally hold back on this behavior, undermining the intent of the work system.  
 
 Related to this, training and trust building associated with HPWS takes time, money, and persistence; done 
right this can bear rich rewards in the long run, but the markets may not reward managers for this kind of long run 
behavior. Adequately training employees to enable them to make substantive improvements in an organization’s 
productivity is initially expensive and takes an ability to see beyond the next quarter. Investing time and energy to 
create a higher trust internal environment takes sustained commitment and an awareness that trust can evaporate 
quickly due to unpredictable behavior on the part of management. Managers need to understand that these up front 
expenses are actually investments in a long-term future and consistently make this case. 
 
 Second, even if new participatory work systems are carefully adopted to a particular firm and industry 
context and fully supported in terms of time and resources, publicly held firms in the U.S. can be easily bought and 
sold – often whether other stakeholders in the work and production system (e.g. employees, managers, suppliers, and 
minority long-term shareholders) approve or not. Takeovers can quickly result in reduced trust, security, and 
autonomy as new owners, often with a more traditional perspective on work systems, begin pressuring executives 
and managers to “cherry pick” the new work system to cut costs (Barnes, 2001). Thus, even if particular managers 
believe that high performance work systems are optimal in the long run and work to support them, financial markets 
may continuously send a different signal, ultimately replacing managers who do not focus on short-term financial 
metrics.    
 
 Third, managers in the U.S. are also steeped in a long tradition of top down hierarchical control, with 
jackpot pay rewards skewing to the highest levels (Singer, 2012). With control, pay and prestige concentrated in 
high level positions, managers attempting to implement and maintain truly empowering HPWS that elevate 
employee voice are doing so in an environment that can send mixed messages about how control and rewards are 
distributed within the firm. Although U.S. managers may say they want to share the power and the gains associated 
with initially successful work systems, it is arguably very difficult to do this in an environment that stresses and 
rewards the “pivotal” roles of solitary individuals and managers.  
 
 Fourth, managers commonly introduce changes in work organization in moments of crisis, when they are 
facing decline or possible bankruptcy. Employees understand this and may be skeptical of true buy-in on the part of 
senior managers. For long run success, managers need to wean themselves of authoritarian tendencies, and using 
authoritarian leadership under duress to implement and drive the design of work signals that the firm and top 
management is not credible (Pfeffer, 1996; Gilmore et al., 1997). High performance work systems are fundamentally 
bottom up, and managers need to learn how to cede some authority and approach decisions differently. 
 
Finally, all of this occurs in an international context where domestic firms implementing higher wage, high 
performance work systems may often be competing with low wage firms abroad that readily pass off negative 
externalities because of relatively weaker environmental and labor laws. Without a level playing field, managers in 
the U.S. implementing work systems with higher standards may face consistent pressure to lower those standards.   
 
IMPLICATIONS & CONCLUSIONS 
 
 At the same time, the 21
st
 century represents an unprecedented challenge as organizations begin to face the 
simultaneous problems of climate change, degraded resource stocks, energy uncertainty, and high levels of 
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inequality and poverty. Employers and employees are thus under increasing pressure to flexibly and efficiently 
produce quality products and services that also minimize negative environmental and social impacts. Flexible and 
complementary workplace arrangements that support continuous employee learning and meaningful participation in 
improving work and production outcomes are appealing in this context, and yet countervailing forces and habits can 
pull key decision makers in other directions.  
 
 Path dependency theory and its extensions are helpful in illuminating how institutional constraints and 
behavioral lock-in can hinder meaningful and long-lasting workplace change, and how to address it. The theory 
implies that workplace change over the past three decades is an evolutionary market process that may not result 
automatically in HPWS; this parallels growing knowledge of other path dependency/path creation stories. In many 
of these cases, and certainly with the case of work evolution in the U.S., implementing a new practice (or product, or 
production process) may involve initial champions who path create in a way that takes into account broader 
constraints and respects and cultivates the respective stakeholders involved in reform. This takes a detailed 
understanding of the old path and the constraints that tend to lock in behavior that may impede and erode new 
alternatives. 
 
 In the case of U.S. workplace evolution, many firms successfully implementing these new systems in the 
past three decades acted like they believed there are basic constraints effectively “locking out” HPWS in the U.S., 
and they took steps to insulate plants from these constraints. For example, in steel and auto, executives and unions 
alike often felt the need to create green-field sites away from original brownfield production facilities, and also 
created separate labor management agreements. Firm decision makers also sought to create stable and long-termist 
ownership; in steel and auto, this often happened with a Japanese or other foreign partner. Unionized workplaces 
well trained in the requirements of these work systems helped to maintain the level and type of employee voice these 
work systems require, particularly in moments of ownership transition and economic uncertainty (Barnes, 2001). 
Thus, in the U.S context, individual organizations may need actors able to see the big picture and to champion and 
defend the new work system, helping to “path create” in the face of constraints.  
 
 Cultivating champions who can create adequate “insulation” and path create may be a short to medium-
term solution for particular organizations. The deeper question is how the most robust versions of high performance 
work systems - those including higher relative job security and greater employee voice and autonomy - can be 
sustained in the U.S. setting in the long-run. This requires a closer examination of broader institutional constraints 
on work systems and the conditions creating behavorial lock-in that can undermine these systems.  
 
 As noted above, corporate governance may be an important component of these broader institutional 
constraints. In Japan, where much of the innovation in work design away from Taylorism and Fordism occurred, the 
country remains resistant to governance reform that would significantly elevate shareholders and pressure managers 
to dismantle a more stakeholder and employee-oriented approach to governance. At the same time in the U.S., 
intense interest in appropriate models of firm governance continues as senior managers, investors, and customers 
increasingly realize that strategic CSR and operationalizing “sustainability” may be crucial for long-run competitive 
advantage. Much more work is needed to understand the mediating variables and drivers that lead to better 
performance in financial, social, and environmental outcomes, and how governance can affect those drivers.   
 
 High performance work systems, with their premium on eliciting continuous creativity and intelligence 
from employees, are well positioned to play a critical role in improving organizational outcomes, including social 
and environmental ones. However, to sustain commitment from employees, employers implementing and attempting 
to sustain these work systems need to respect the needs of employees. HPWS are premised on the notion that 
increased commitment from employees will help drive performance, but this is in return for commitment from 
employers in the form of higher rewards, including greater relative security, autonomy, and pay. If governance 
structures ultimately lock in managerial behavior running against the grain of HPWS through a propensity for short 
run cost cutting, mixed messages about control, and prematurely or unpredictably threating job security, then the 
governance model itself may need to be critically examined. As the questions have evolved from whether to 
implement HPWS to how to adopt them to their particular context and sustain them for the long term, it behooves 
researchers and practitioners to more carefully investigate and respect the broader forces at play that influence these 
work systems.  
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